Social tillit och korruption i Grekland : en fallstudie om det kollektiva handlandets problem

Sammanfattning: Greece has a long record of failed attempts to curb corruption. Due to the systemic character of the corrupt practices, namely clientelism, anti-corruption strategies are re-peatedly intervened by particularistic interest groups. On the basis of surveys conducted on social trust and perception of corruption, along with data on socioeconomic inequality and attitudes to civic participation, this case study investigates clientelism as a problem of collective action. With a theoretical perspective including theories of social capi-tal, social trust, clientelism and inequality, this study analyzes the basis for collective action to happen. I argue that the specific characteristics of three factors; trust, inequality and civic participation; can amount to either systemic corruption or inclusive collective action. This case study finds that collective action in Greece suffers from low trust, high inequality, and a weak civil society, which makes clientelism repeate itself. The collective action approach to systemic corruption enables a broad analysis. In order to curb corruption, trust has to be created.