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Detta är en Magister-uppsats från Institutionen för ekonomi och företagande

Sammanfattning: What and how companies choose to base their dividend of bonus and options on to the company’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is important, not only out of the owners perspective, but also out of the community- and research perspectives. Our main purpose with this study is to examine what kind of trends we can notice in the companies incentive programs to the CEO during the years 2000-2006 and in what extent the different trends occur. We also aim to see if there have been any changes in the companies incentive programs in contract to the scandal of Skandia that took place in 2003. We aim to do this research through reading the 30 companies with the highest turnover on the Stockholm Stock exchanges annual reports. To get another view on it and to help understand the results we have chosen to complement the research with an interview and previous research. We have, through our research, come to the conclusion that there are trends to notice in the companies incentives. Over all, we consider that shareholders have confidence in their CEOs, because of the increase in bonus payments and the maximum level of bonus, at the same time as percentage bonus payments of the basic salary were unchanged. The scandal of Skandia has not had any larger influence on the design of the incentives, except some minor downturns during 2003 and 2004. During 2003 the bonus payments declined and in 2004 the maximum level of bonus declined. The application of options declined from 2003 and at the same time the application of bonus increased. We could notice that the companies started to account more openly for CEOs incentives because of the new laws that where introduced in the beginning of 2000.

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