Nekande tvångsmakt i Operation Unified Protector

Sammanfattning: There are several competing views on how to best utilize air power. Following his quantitative study of air power, Robert Pape developed a theory which focuses on undermining the target state's military strategy. According to Pape it is possible to explain the outcome as a result of military vulnerability. This essay seeks to determine if Pape's theory can predict the outcome of Operation Unified Protector. By using a mixed methods approach on four hypotheses, it will be determined if the operation was a successful case of coercion, if NATO acted according to Pape's model and whether this achieved the desired effects or not.   The results reveal that the theory could not successfully predict the outcome of the conflict. The operation was a coercive failure despite high military vulnerability as a consequence of denial operations. NATO's actions could be explained by Pape's model, yet this did not accomplish a behavioral change in the Gaddafi regime. Consequently, it is discussed if coercion is viable against an adversary who is not rational. Earlier claims that high demands impedes the effectiveness of coercion and that strategies of denial results in higher military vulnerability were strengthened, whereas cooperation between indigenous ground forces and foreign air power has to be further researched.