Separating the Good, the Bad and the Ugly: A game theoretic approach to evaluating the role of intrinsic motivation as an enabler of CSR certificates to function as market signals

Sammanfattning: Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has in recent times gone from a topic rarely touched upon to a moral obligation. Companies certify themselves with various CSR certificates in order to signal their social performance while buyers struggle to distinguish those truly providing a social good from those only taking symbolic action - greenwashing. In this thesis, we examine whether intrinsic motivations to provide a social good can be basis for separation in a traditional signaling setting, allowing certificates to act as market signals carrying strategic weight. Using a game theoretic approach, we conduct an experiment by distributing an online survey designed to distinguish if the certificates result in a separating or pooling equilibria. Our main finding is that intrinsic motivations can enable certificates to be separating and in turn distinguish those who back symbolic claims with substantive action.