Attribution of Profits to Dependent Agent Permanent Establishments : The dual taxpayer approach versus the single taxpayer approach

Sammanfattning: Business profits constitute the main part of income derived through international business and these profits are only to be taxed in the home state of the enterprise. However, if the enterprise conducts business in a host state through a PE, the profits attributable to the PE are taxable in the host state. Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax determines the profits attributable to the PE. Nevertheless, Member States have interpreted Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention in various ways. In order to provide consensus the OECD adopted an authorised OECD approach for attributing profits to PEs. The first part of the purpose of this thesis is to study the Swedish approach for attributing profits to dependent agent PEs in relation to the authorised OECD approach. An enterprise from the home state can be considered to have a dependent agent PE in the host state if it conducts business in the host state through a dependent agent located therein. This is provided that the agent has the authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise and exercises this authority regularly. Under the authorised OECD approach for profit attribution to dependent agent PEs it is possible to allocate profits to the PE in excess of the arm’s length remuneration paid to the dependent agent. Thereby, the OECD has adopted the dual taxpayer approach as the authorised OECD approach. According to the author’s opinion the Swedish perspective regarding profit attribution to dependent agent PEs differs from the authorised OECD approach as the dual taxpayer approach so far has not been applied in Sweden. Furthermore, it differs as the attribution of capital to PEs is not allowed according to case law and as far as the recognition of internal dealings is concerned. When the OECD adopted the dual taxpayer approach as the authorised OECD approach another method was available; the single taxpayer approach. In line with this approach no further profits in excess of the arm’s length remuneration to the dependent agent can be attributed to the dependent agent PE. However, the single taxpayer approach was rejected as the authorised OECD approach, which has lead to disagreement within the international tax community. Therefore, the second part of the purpose of this thesis is to study to what extent the authorised OECD approach is sustained. This is done by analysing reactions to the single and dual taxpayer approach among business and academic circles. The author believes that reactions against the dual taxpayer approach mainly arise in situations when an enterprise in the host state gives rise to a dependent agent PE. Therefore, the authorised OECD approach should have recognised that different types of dependent agent PEs might arise and the approach is only sustained to the extent that a person belonging to the foreign enterprise leads to the existence of a dependent agent PE.