Tillfällig nödvändighet : En möjlig(a) värld(arna)s paradox och den aletiska modalitetens gåta

Sammanfattning: The writer has attempted to discuss the distinction between the necessary and the contingent. It begins with a criticism against the possibility for a so-called ‘a possible worlds realism’ to give a “philosophical explanation” of this distinction. The writer argues that this is impossible, since it requires that a notion of this distinction be already accepted (more precisely that the necessity of such a theory is already accepted). After this specific criticism, the writer intends to show that this is a more general problem that follows any explanation of the contingent/necessary distinction. The writer then discusses the counter-argument that the requirements placed on these explanations are set to high, therefore the writer shows in theory the problem can be solved and sketches a more specific way how to explain and show the basis for this distinction.