Storbritanniens utrikespolitik under Falklandskriget 1982 : En kvalitativ fallstudie om de brittiska beslutsfattarnas motiv och eventuellt bakomliggande sådana

Sammanfattning: When Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands in 1982, it was the beginning of a two month long war. The aim of this essay is to find alternative explanations to the Falklands war with the main question being whether there were hidden motives for Thatcher and her reactions in 1982.   The essay will focus on the period 1965-1982 in which different texts will be analyzed by applying theories. The diversionary war theory describes how state leaders can improve their political popularity by intentionally escalating a conflict. The geopolitical theory explains how a state, by investments, constructions and military, can create demographic and international perceptions regarding a territory while foreign political theory describes how decision making is affected by the bureaucracy, psychology and the international system.   The ministry of defense and the navy was heavily affected by the financial cuts during the conflict and may also have affected the manner in which they advised Thatcher in 1982. Because of the British unwillingness to invest geopolitically in the Falklands and their aggravation of the diplomatically efforts to find a peaceful solution, the conflict got worse. In addition, Thatchers intentions to implement economic reforms and her record low political popularity make it plausible to suspect her for having, intentionally, escalated the conflict to gain political popularity and to enable the economic reforms.