Det var inte jag, det var min robot! - En kartläggning av det skadeståndsrättsliga behovet av en elektronisk personlighet samt en analys av dess potentiella civilrättsliga konsekvenser

Sammanfattning: The past few years a new type of advanced robots have developed that possess a high degree of technical autonomy. Because of the developments in artificial intelligence they can make autonomous decisions and act independently in new environments. When that kind of smart robots cause damage, existing liability rules cover damage that can be traced back to a human agent. According to the European Parliament resolution on civil law rules in robotics the current rules on liability will not suffice to give rise to liability for damages caused by such smart robots. An electronic personality is presented as a way to regulate liability. That would entail that smart robots, like natural persons and legal persons, are recognised as persons in law. Thereby they can be held liable for damages they may cause. With Swedish law as point of departure, the purpose of this thesis is to critically investigate the need of an electronic personality from a tort law perspective and to analyse its consequences for civil law. By using a legal dogmatic method and a critical perspective, I find the current liability laws to be enough to give rise to legal liability for damage caused by smart robots. A producer is strictly liable for damage that is caused by a defective robot. The producer’s liability for defective products is not affected by the fact that the product in question is a robot. If the damage is dependent on the behaviour of the robot rather than a defect, liability is based on negligence. Several human agents can be held liable according to the general rule of negligence based liability, even when the robot autonomously causes damage. By prescribing a strict liability or a vicarious liability for the owner of the robot it is possible to increase the responsibility of the owner. By examining the arguments regarding why an electronic personality would be a better way to handle tortuous liability compared to the current view of robots as objects, I discover that there is no need of an electronic personality. The thesis also shows that the consequences for civil law in general would be comprehensive if we were to introduce an electronic personality. Not only for tort law, but also for contract law. Even if an electronic person would aim at solving a problem in liability law I find it probable that it would create new problems in other areas of the law.