EU-rättens hantering av idrottsliga hinder av den fria rörligheten för arbetstagare
Sammanfattning: The phenomenon of sport has historically enjoyed a special status in law, which has meant that sport and its organisations themselves have been regulating their activities by legislating their own laws and rules without interference from the rest of society. The reasons for this are several but are often based on the idea that sport is such a phenomenon that does not lend itself to be force into the society's other frames. In step with the increasing commercialization in sport, society are beginning to demand that the rules that apply in general must also apply to sport. This has meant a development where previously unchallenged autonomy of sport is gradually restricted. EU law entry has been a factor in this development, since the decisions of sports governing bodies are increasingly challenged by EU law rules. This has meant that today the rights and obligations that sport and its practitioners enjoys originates partly from the rules laid down by sporting bodies but also from the "common" law. An interesting situation arises when these rules represent different interests, and perhaps even stand in direct conflict with each other. On these occasions the result has often been that sport has had to change its rules, which often has led to revolutionary changes for sport. This paper examine how such a situation in the field of labor law is treated. The paper aims to analyse how EU law on free movement of workers is related to sport. On the one hand, EU law on free movement of workers aims to complete the internal market. On the other hand, there are sport rules about transitions and compositions of law that aims to affirm the sporting interests such as safeguarding sporting competition and the regularity of sporting competitions. Based on practice, the legal cases analyzed in the paper outlines the obstacles that sport rules have meant to the free movement of workers, as well as how the EU Court assessed whether these can be accepted. This survey of the relevant practice shows that the assessment by the EU court to determine whether an obstacle to freedom of movement is acceptable revolve on an assessment whether there is a legitimate purpose for the rule, and whether this rule in turn is proportional in its ambition to achieve this objective.
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