Möjligheten till eftergift av konkurrensskadeavgift i kartellärenden

Sammanfattning: Abstract Within competition law, cartels are defined as a very serious and infringement and are prohibited. This ban exists both within EU law and in Swedish law and looks largely the same. As the EU has developed their program to combat cartels, Sweden has been affected to have a more harmonized EU system when it comes to combating these types of anti-competitive collaborations. Leniency systems have emerged in Europe as well as in Sweden and they are based on the principle that a member of a cartel might act as "whistle-blower" and uncover the cooperation with the aim of avoiding fines and go free from punishment. Only one company in the cartel can obtain full immunity, and it must thus be the first to report infringement to the Competition Authority. It is also possible to have reduction of fines and a ticket system has been developed by ECN (European Competition Network) which has not been adopted in Swedish law. Our current Competition Act adopted in 2008 contains provisions for leniency which were introduced in Swedish law in a former act from 2002. It has since emerged mainly one significant case in Sweden where the question of immunity has become important, but this case was tried under the former Competition Act of 1993. It is thus uncertain whether our Swedish leniency system is effective or not, and if companies are discouraged to participate in cartels when a member at any time can pull the handbrake, reveal cooperation and obtain immunity from fines. Since the Swedish system is more and more becoming EU harmonized and based on EU case-law and practices, which are more developed, the EU development has to be taken into consideration when considering the leniency model in Swedish law. This study focuses on illustrating how the Swedish and EU legal system for the leniency looks and the problem that is presumed to exist regarding the efficacy in Swedish law.