Likgiltighetsuppsåt : En rättsanalys av diskrepansen i underrätternas domskäl

Sammanfattning: In Swedish law the difference between an action labeled as reckless and an action labelled as intentional is differentiated through the concept called likgiltighetsuppsåt. (deliberate indifferance.) This concept has been demonstrated to be hard to apply correctly by the discrepancies in the reasonings of the lower courts. The main purpose of this master thesis is to discern which ways these discrepancies occur, why they occur, and discuss some potential ways to fix the problems at hand.  To be able to clearly pinpoint the problematic areas this thesis gives an overarching historic background of the term ”likgiltighetsuppsåt” and how it got established as the borderline between recklessness and intentional actions. Which cases from the Supreme Court played a part in establishing the concept, aswell as which key phrases are essential for correct usage of the term will also be discussed. It also details the alternative versions of the term, aswell as its predecessor, called eventuellt uppsåt. This groundwork eventually leads to a discussion of specific courtcases from the lower courts, and the problems that arised when the courts demonstrates a lack of understanding in how to apply the term likgiltighetsuppsåt correctly on the current situation. Through an analysis of these court decisions, the problems seem to stem from a few different misconceptions of the wording from the Supreme Courts prescedents. These misconceptions has in turn led to inadequate reasonings from the lower courts. Other than those misconceptions, the problems also arise from the sheer complextity of applying likgiltighetsuppsåt on the current situation.   When the problems has been thoroughly highlighted a discussion regarding potential solutions will transpire. The most favorable solution is the implementation of certain flowcharts combined with an increased level of detailed rendition of the Supreme Courts prescedents in the reasonings of the lower courts.