Bootleggers and Baptists in American Fuel Economy Regulation – A qualitative content analysis of American automakers’ attitudes towards CAFE-standards

Sammanfattning: The thesis aims to explain the American automaker’s drastic shift in opinion regarding Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)-standards. After years of lobbying for weaker standards, the automakers suddenly dropped their support for President Trump’s deregulatory attempts and sided with California, the state Trump had an ongoing legal fight with over fuel economy regulation. The thesis intends to outline the carmakers’ motives behind the sudden shift, based on the theory of bootleggers and Baptists, a theory which highlights situations where otherwise conflicting groups form coalitions to support a certain regulation, but for totally different reasons (economic and ethical). A method of qualitative content analysis is applied in order to determine if the automakers changed their position on the issue for economic or ethical (environmental) reasons. By analyzing official statements, protocols from shareholder meetings as well as media sources, I find that both arguments occur frequently but that the economic arguments for keeping strict CAFE-standards are used predominantly. In addition, I distinguish two groups within the automakers: the early adopters and the later followers. I conclude that the automakers are bootleggers for using primarily economic arguments for supporting strict CAFE-standards, while also expanding the theory to explaining differences within the bootlegger camp.