Locus Standi of Private Applicants under Article 230 (4) EC: Undue Restriction or over-Criticism?

Sammanfattning: Under Community legal system, private parties are vested with only a restricted capacity to bring an action for annulment of allegedly unlawful Community rules Angela Ward, 'Judicial review and the right of the private parties in EC law', Oxford University Press, New York 2000. The conditions for ordinary parties to have locus standi were provided in Article 230 (4) EC [ex 173 (2)] and have been interpreted by the Court of Justice in its case law. It is widely agreed that such conditions are strict and not easy to be fulfilled. One may suggest that the interpretation given by the ECJ to the requirements of Article 230(4) EC is highly restrictive and that provisions of the Treaty regarding the right of the interested parties to bring an action must not be interpreted restrictively. However, the question whether it is appropriate to widen locus standi of individuals when they challenge the validity of Community acts before the Community Court has been the subject of extensive debate among practitioners and in the legal literature. The two landmark cases - Jégo-Quéré, delivered by the CFI on 3 may 2002 and UPA delivered by the ECJ on 25 July 2002 - provide vivid examples of this controversy. The theme of this thesis is the question whether locus standi of private applicants under article 230 (4) EC is unduly restricted or is the large amount of criticisms unwarranted. I will begin by analyzing some aspects on which the conditions of private applicants' standing are explicitly based. In this part, I will attempt to answer two questions why the private parties bring an action for annulment and on what grounds their application should be admitted. Then the thesis goes on with the description of individual concern condition as a necessary filter in order to admit the challenges, in case private parties seek proceedings to annul a general application act or an act addressed to another person. Finally, I will dilate upon the arguments made by AG F. Jacobs in UPA case, the findings of CFI in Jégo-Quéré case and the departure of ECJ in UPA case from the earlier opinions or decisions on the point. The question in these cases was whether it was appropriate to widen locus standi of individuals when they challenged the validity of Community acts before the Community Court. The new rules on locus standi of private parties provided in the Constitutional Treaty are also specifically mentioned in this part. However, due to the unclear future of the European Constitution, such rules are just presented briefly. I apparently find no reason for contesting the current conditions on locus standi because they are based on the balance between the adverse effect and adequate remedy, efficacy of the action for annulment as one of the instruments of many available remedies in the Community complete system of remedies, overall effectiveness of Community system, the need to protect Institutions from judicial review challenged by private applicants, and the capacity of Community Courts for coping with a deluge cases. A strong suggestion could not be based on one specific aspect. In order to answer the question whether or not locus standi should be opened, a broad assessment is needed to be carried out. Drawing locus standi of private parties should be based mainly on the adverse legal effect of the contested act that applicant suffered. However there are several other elements that must be taken into account, such as effectiveness of community system, the need to protect Institutions from judicial review challenged by private applicant, the capacity of Community Courts for coping with deluge cases, etc. The value of the former and the latter must be equally considered and the balance between them needs to be struck up.