Insatsen ingen ville samordna

Sammanfattning: During Sweden’s commitment in the international intervention in Afghanistan the policymaking regarding the civil-military coordination measures failed. The Swedish government stated and emphasized in their appropriations and strategies that their intent – cooperation and synergies – were a crucial point for mission success. Even so, the government didn´t take any actions clarifying how their intent should be met. Who, how and why were questions left unanswered from the government to the authorities and personnel on the field level in Afghanistan. The research question guiding us through this thesis is: Why did the government fail in the implementation process of the civil-military cooperation on the field level in Afghanistan? To narrow down the extent of the thesis the author has chosen three management theories – decentralization, legitimacy and implementation – incorporated in three hypotheses. After using these three hypotheses as an analytic tool the author has come to the following conclusions: Because of traditional Swedish governance and the lack of an appointed process manager, the questions who, how and why could only be answered by authorities and field personnel from their own perspective. Because of these circumstances there never was a coherent Swedish contribution regarding civil-military cooperation.