Al-Qaida - mellan tankeprodukt och reell fiende

Sammanfattning: The present thesis closer examines what has come to be known as al-Qaida, partly from what al-Qaida is considered to be, partly from the consequences a certain picture of al-Qaida might give rise to. Between 1988-2001 most of this thesis sources refers to al-Qaida as a small, organized core group with some degree of cell structure. From 1991 to present days, many of the sources enlarge the picture of al-Qaida. From now on they start to view al-Qaida as either a network in itself or al-Qaida as a part of a larger islamistic network, not only as an organized core group with presumptive bases in Afghanistan. The most recent of theories regarding al-Qaida looks at al-Qaida as an ideology in itself (al-Qaedaism) or al-Qaida as a part of previously existing ideologies (Islamism, Neofundamentalism and Jihadism-Salafism). Al-Qaida is being seen - by scholars, journalists and terrorism experts - as an organization with a core group, a network in itself, part of a larger islamistic network and an ideology of its own or as a part of already existing ideologies. In some cases al-Qaida is viewed as a mixture of all of the three theories. Al-Qaida - between a product of thought and a real enemy - summarizes the opposite poles in which the theories concerning al-Qaida are located. Many of the sources in this essay views al-Qaida as an amalgamated phenomenon, neither a downright organization, a downright network nor a downright ideology, instead a phenomenon, which contains elements of them all. The present picture of al-Qaida - extremely diversified with three dominating theories that control and reflect the image of al-Qaida - receive the important consequence that it widens the threat from what is seen as al-Qaida, which this thesis concludes might give rise to islamophobia. Another important consequence this thesis identifies is that the greater threat al-Qaida is considered to be, the more difficult it will be - for intelligence agencies - to meet the diversified and asymmetric threat.