The Problem of Stability and the Balance of Power - Markets and Democracy Without External Enforcement for Three Players

Detta är en C-uppsats från Handelshögskolan i Stockholm/Institutionen för nationalekonomi

Författare: Gustav Axén; [2016]

Nyckelord: Anarchy; State of Nature; Markets; Democracy; Bargaining;

Sammanfattning: We analyze a non-cooperative game for three players intended to represent the stability of political systems. We compare a market and a democratic system to see how they modify an anarchic outcome in terms of stability. The market process is represented by a sequential bargaining game and the democratic process is represented by a voting game where players elect a leader that selects the allocation of resources. We find that under our assumptions markets and democracy have the same implications for stability when the two systems can be compared with each other.

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