Medvetande, intentionalitet och artificiell intelligens : Är stark AI möjlig?
Sammanfattning: This paper addresses strong artificial intelligence (AI) and, if it is possible,if consciousness could be replicated. Focus lies on Searle's article Minds,brains and programs and David J. Chalmers's theory that consciousness can be replicated because it is as an organizational invariant. The purpose is to evaluate Searle's argument against strong AI in light of Chalmers theory that simulation is replication in terms of consciousness. My thesis is that Chalmers can show that simulation can be replication but not that it is enough to prove strong AI possible. My conclusion is that Searle's arguments against strong AI in the said article does not hold but Chalmers also cannot prove that consciousness can be replicated. However, Chalmers can prove that simulation and replication in some cases can be the same. If it would be possible for some type of semantic content to emerge from syntax, the path for strong AI is open.
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