Rasism och svensk exceptionalism – en kritik av Sveriges ovilja att kriminalisera rasistiska organisationer

Sammanfattning: In the last year a number of notable events with ties to Nazi groups, such as demonstrations and brutal attacks, have occurred in Sweden. The media has also reported on numerous occasions that the UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has repeatedly criticized Sweden. The criticism has focused on the fact that the country has not complied with Article 4 (b) of the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) by criminalizing organizations that promote and incite racial discrimination. However, Sweden has since its accession in 1971 been of the opinion that it does fulfil the obligations following this provision, even though they have never prohibited racist organizations by law. The aim of this thesis is to examine how Sweden has argued its position not to impose a ban on racist organizations and how this position differs from the one CERD takes. The intention is to better understand what the Swedish reluctance to legislate against racist organizations is based on. The investigation was conducted using argument analysis and Critical Race Theory. In the centre of the investigation were the preparatory works that examined the matter of Sweden’s accession to ICERD, the country’s periodic reports sent to CERD to present how it complies with the convention and the Committee’s responses to these reports and its general recommendations regarding the interpretation of Article 4 (b). The investigation has shown that Sweden is essentially using the same arguments in order to explain why it has never imposed an organization ban. One of the main arguments is that the need for such a ban has never arisen, since the problems with racial discrimination in the country have not been assessed as particularly serious. Hence, Sweden holds that there is no reason for taking such an extensive measure as criminalizing organizations. This reasoning is based on another provision of the ICERD, Article 2.1 (d), which according to Sweden stipulates that the States parties should only take those legislative measures that can be deemed required by the circumstances of each country. If the circumstances give rise to the assessment that no such need exists, it is not necessary to comply verbatim with the stipulation in Article 4 (b) according to Sweden. Another one of Sweden’s arguments is also based on this interpretation of Article 2.1 (d), as the country refers to other existing criminal provisions in Swedish law in order to justify its reluctance to introduce a ban. In Sweden’s opinion these provisions make it impossible for racist organizations to function, which means that there is no reason to prohibit the organizations themselves because they cannot operate successfully anyway. Sweden refers furthermore to various human rights like freedom of expression and association, claiming that an organization ban cannot be imposed since this would constitute an excessive restriction of these freedoms. My conclusions are that Sweden’s argumentation largely reflects a belief in Swedish exceptionalism in matters relating to racism. The reasoning is characterized by the conviction that Sweden is a country that has neither historically nor presently been affected by racial discrimination or racism in general; instead these phenomena are considered to be unusual occurrences in the Swedish society. Through examinations of the country’s historical background it is however possible to establish that this is not the case and that Sweden’s argument that there has never been any need for an organization ban thereby cannot be accepted. The same applies to the argument that the presence of other criminal provisions makes it impossible for racist organizations to operate. Despite these provisions the organizations’ activities have in fact continued. Sweden sees itself as a country immune to racism, which means that it diminishes the problem of racial discrimination in general and also reduces it to a problem that manifests itself solely at a micro level, instead of seeing racism as the integrated part of Swedish society that it has historically been. This line of reasoning enables the position that it is not necessary to impose a ban on racist organizations despite the fact that CERD has repeatedly requested it. For the same reasons I do not consider it plausible that Sweden will criminalize racist organizations in the future, unless the Swedish self-image fundamentally changes and the country acknowledges both its racist history and present.