CRISPR AND THETREATMENT/EN DISTINCTION : On Vagueness, Borderline Cases and Germline Genome Editing

Sammanfattning: In this thesis, I argue that the treatment/enhancement distinction that is central to the ethical debate concerning germline genome editing and CRISPR is too vague to be ethically and normatively guiding. The problem of vagueness is twofold, being both a semantic and epistemic issue. This vagueness creates borderline cases, cases that cannot be properly defined as either treatment or enhancement, I call this The Borderline Cases Argument. These borderline cases enable a slippery slope towards eugenic practices, radical enhancement and dangerous applications of CRISPR. The distinction therefore fails to be action guiding as it cannot distinguish treatment from enhancement as well as failing to correspond to what is genuinely morally problematic with germline genome editing and not, I call this The Argument of Missing the Point. In using the treatment/enhancement distinction we therefore risk losing control over how CRISPR is used and for what purposes.