RPM and Object Restrictions – A Need for Change in EU Competition Policy? : A comparative analysis of the different approaches towards RPM in EU and US Antitrust Law

Sammanfattning: The United States and the European Union operate in the world’s two most powerful systems of competition law and policy, whose enforcement and judicial institutions employ similar concepts and legal language. Nevertheless, the two systems have reached different results across a number of significant antitrust issues. One such issue is the approach taken towards vertical price fixing and, in particular, the practice referred to as resale price maintenance. Resale price maintenance generally includes the predetermination of a fixed or minimum retail price in a vertical distribution agreement.   In European competition law, resale price maintenance is considered a hardcore restriction of competition and is thereby presumed to infringe Article 101(1) TFEU by its object. The presumption is strong and has proved difficult to rebut in practice. In the United States, the US Supreme Court changed its approach towards resale price maintenance in its 2007 landmark decision Leegin. The majority overturned its nearly century old precedent regarding resale price maintenance, concluding that the practice is no longer to be treated as a per se violation of antitrust law but should instead be subject to a rule of reason analysis. The judgment was the last in a series of different cases, all demonstrating a complete reversal in the approach towards both price and non-price vertical restraints. The change of approach in the United States was largely influenced by developments in economic thinking addressing the potential pro-competitive effects of resale price maintenance. Even though the European Union has modernised and renewed its competition rules to be more in line with economic theory, some uncertainties and difficulties seem to remain regarding the scope of the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements and the possible efficiencies resulting from vertical price fixing. These issues have constituted the main focus for this thesis, which aims to examine vertical price fixing and the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements in Article 101(1) TFEU.   The policy view towards resale price maintenance in the European Union has been subject to great discussion and debate, and it has been argued that the approach towards the restriction is too strict. The legal framework for vertical agreements is now up for review and it is of interest to examine the appropriateness of the prohibition on resale price maintenance, especially in the light of two recent judgments. The thesis shows that there might be sufficient arguments for a change of approach towards resale price maintenance also in the European Union.