Om Wittgensteins Tractatus : ett solipsistiskt begreppssystem och dess funktion

Sammanfattning: The aim of this thesis is to find out whether Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be equated with a conceptual system or ”Begriffsschrift”, and what the function of such a representative system would be. How can solipsism, idealism and realism be understood given that interpretation? Wittgenstein’s early philosophical inquiry revolved around the same problem with which Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell had dealt with. But according to Georg Henrik von Wright, Wittgenstein forcefully questioned their idea that logic can constitute a general foundation and Wittgenstein was particularly against the idea that mathematics requires a foundation of logic. The thesis discusses how this can be deduced from a close reading of Russell’s introduction to the Tractatus. The results from this reading coupled with a review of the concepts of solipsism and subject give a divergent interpretation on what is complex and what can only be shown. The study indicates that what solipsism disclose is that a variable that consists of ”I”, referred to a subject, cannot be equated with a variable ”x” because ”I” include an unwanted function which gives rise to a nonsensical generality.