Omvänt umgängessabotage — Kan lojalitet mellan avtalsparter uppnås genom fångarnas dilemma?

Sammanfattning: I have identified a problem of cooperation in the field of divorced parents spending time with their children. The problem is that one parent is deliberately absent and not fulfilling the agreements of spending time with the children. I have called it reverse visitation interference, and I haven’t found any legal solution to it. Therefore, I have evaluated if the problem can be prevented by agreements. The problem situation has been analysed using the game theory The Prisoners’ Dilemma. This dilemma is characterized by the fact that the best mutual outcome of the conflict is never reached, because that happens only when both parties choose cooperation over non-cooperation which neither part choses since it tends to be too risky if the other part does not choose cooperation. My idea was to examine if sanctions can affect the non-wanted parental behavior. Having introduced sanctions to the game I used game theory to examine the situation, and it turned out that it worked. Then I identified another unwanted behaviour, mischievous notifications. This risk is handled by the code of judicial procedure (rättegångsbalken), and the loosing part must pay for both parties’ legal costs. After I concluded that the non-wanted behavior that I called reverse visitation interference could be prevented with inspiration from the analyzed game theories, I tried to construct sanctions. I then concluded that fines or indemnity have the wanted form of correction effect. Then I formulated contractual terms that should work. The game theory has showed to work when dealing with analysing difficult situations where cooperation seems to be hard to find. We can’t assume that grown-ups take love for their children granted. The legal system, either private of public, could offer tools for this. It is gratifying that it might be this kind of tools.