Att ställa den skyddsbehövande inför rätta : Om de rättsliga förutsättningarna för att förhindra skyddslöshet vid tillämpningen av Flyktingkonventionens uteslutandeklausuler och samtidigt motverka straffrihet för de grova folkrättsbrott som faller under k

Sammanfattning: The purpose of this study has been to investigate the prospects for identifying and prosecuting individuals suspected of war crimes, within the process of exclusion from refugee status under article 1F(a) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and using subsequent mechanisms for extradition or prosecution in international criminal law. A number of principles within human rights law and public international law have been advocated by the UNCHR and several human rights NGOs as necessary for a thorough application of the exclusion clauses; one that takes individual responsibility into account and upholds the aims and purposes of the exclusion clauses. There is a discussion as to whether specialised or accelerated exclusion procedures are justified for reasons of security and efficiency, or if they put the rights of the individual at risk and limit the opportunities for gathering information to support investigation and prosecution of the crime in question. Apart from the instruments of asylum law and procedure that have emerged within the EU harmonisation process, there are no general, binding rules on the procedural aspects of the exclusion clauses. One principle that regulates the consequences for the individual of exclusion from refugee status and decisions on extradition is, however, the principle of non-refoulement. Although partly contested in state practice, there is widespread consensus in international jurisprudence and doctrine that the principle, following its status as a jus cogens rule, prohibits every state from returning any individual to a territory where he or she may face torture or other cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment, irrespective of any security risks that the individual may pose to the custodial state. Extradition or prosecution of individuals suspected of crimes under article 1F(a), based on universal jurisdiction and the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, has gained increased support from international conventions, such as the 1948 Convention on Genocide and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The principles are widely upheld by human rights NGOs, and tendencies in practice and policy among the member states of the EU and the parties to the Rome Statute point towards the development of a customary rule of universal jurisdiction among these states. Continuing resistance to the Rome Statute and to universal jurisdiction among influential states such as the USA, Russia, China and India nevertheless serves to exclude these states from being bound by such an emerging customary rule of universal jurisdiction. There are compelling arguments as to why breaches of jus cogens-rules should include or give rise to erga omnes rights or obligations for all states to exercise universal jurisdiction over such breaches. Without the support of major states it is, however, difficult to establish the existence of the general state acceptance of universal jurisdiction as is required for the principle to attain jus cogens-status and become universally applicable, regardless of state consent. Future prospects for adequate and efficient identification and prosecution of suspected war criminals depend on the correct and thorough application of the exclusion clauses, in combination with the development of existing rules of universal jurisdiction, and not least on the willingness and ability of states to overcome the political, economic and institutional obstacles that presently may prevent many states from extraditing or prosecuting individuals who fall within the scope of article 1F(a) of the exclusion clauses.