Konsekvensanalys av olika förändringar i intäktsrams-regleringen avseende hänsyn till leveranssäkerhet

Sammanfattning: The distribution of electricity is a natural monopoly. The infrastructure of the electricity grid is divided into areas and the distribution system operator (DSO) has concession for the distribution of the defined area. The concession is governed by laws and regulation.The Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate (Ei) is the national regulatory authority. The continuity of supply of electricity is a part of the regulation. The incentive is given by a revenue cap regulation which may result in a reward or penalty.The performance indicators are a measure of the continuity of supply and used in the calculation of the revenue cap regulation.The Master thesis aims to specify the possible consequences for the electricity distribution system operators and their customers utilizing the electricity grid in case of a change of the current methods used to measure the continuity of supply in Sweden.With the current methods, the Ei regulation for year 2016-2019, is the continuity of supply in the local electrical grid estimated from a view where each disruption is treated equal and therefore is SAIFI and SAIDI used. In the regional electrical grid is another method used to measure the continuity of supply, estimated from a view where the loss of supplied energy is considered, therefore uses PNS and ENS. In the documentation is the term ILE used for ENS and ILEffekt for PNS.The Master thesis is constructed to analyze new performance indicators for the local and regional distribution grid. The new performance indicator is the mathematically instrument to measure the continuity of supply and is supported by analytically advantages and disadvantages.The result shows the choice of performance indicators cause a great impact in the revenue cap regulation. AIT, AIF corresponds to ENS and PNS, respectively, divided by power. The three most important results are given by:1. Mathematical and theoretical results show that ENS, PNS are not good indicators individually or in combination with SAIDI, SAIFI and CEMI4 as power consumption within each customer group varies in the local electrical grid.In the regional electrical grid, power consumption may also vary between the norm period and the supervisory period, which means that ENS, PNS can sometimes be misleading.2. The inclusion of power disruption over 12 hours generate stronger incentives in the regulation. Because it requires long term planning to avoid interruptions exceeding 12 hours. The difference is shown mainly in local electrical grid with the indicators SAIDI, SAIFI and CEMI4 and gives a slight increase in rewards in the regulation. This affects the DSO’s and their customers with a marginal difference.3. In the short term, the introduction of AIT, AIF as quality indicators means that customers who consume more power within their customer group get higher-value interruptions. An interruption of a high-consumption customer would then be prioritized compared to a customer with a lower consumption. One way to counteract this is to use CEMI4, in order to capture these customers' interruptions in the regulation.In the long term, the regulation does not become cyclically sensitive, meaning that reasonable rewards or penalties are made. This should benefit a long-term planning of the electrical grid, as the DSO’s do not have to compensate for this.