En vetospelares guide till status quo - FN:s säkerhetsråd och vetospelarteorin

Detta är en Kandidat-uppsats från Lunds universitet/Statsvetenskapliga institutionen

Sammanfattning: In this qualitative study the author examines the United Nations security council and its possibilities to reform, with help of George Tsebelis theory regarding veto players. The application of the veto player theory gives the ability to measure the policystability, the extent of ability to change policy, when adding more players to a political institution. The study is based on the United Nations security procedures while applying the veto player theory. The analysis is based on three reformproposals regarding the council. These three proposals are de-constructed and made into four theoretic proposals, isolationg the tre categories of membership, which represents the reformproposals. The vetoplayer theory is applied to these theoretic proposals to examine what the outcome will be if adding non-permanent, permanent (without vetopower) and permanent (with vetopowers) members. The fourh theoretic proposals includes the proposal of reforming the vetopower. The study concludes that inceasing the council with members without vetopower doesnt effect the policy stability in any higher capacity. Increasing the number of members with vetopower will increase the policystability. Reforms regarding the vetopower will not be possible according to the veto player theory.

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