Philosophical Zombies and Moral Responsibility : An Analysis of Whether Philosophical Zombies Would Have Moral Responsibility or Not

Detta är en Kandidat-uppsats från Linköpings universitet/Institutionen för kultur och samhälle

Sammanfattning: Philosophical zombies are beings that look exactly like humans and behave in the same way as humans do. The only difference between humans and philosophical zombies is that philosophical zombies lack consciousness. This means that they can complain, cry, laugh and say that they are in pain. However, emotionally, they will never experience these feelings. Philosophical zombies have no desires, no values, and no empathy. Despite philosophical zombies lacking all these qualities, the question can be raised whether, if they were to exist in our world, would they have any moral responsibility? This question becomes pressing because even though philosophical zombies feel nothing and lack consciousness, they are still capable of doing harm and able to act immorally. By using David Shoemaker's (2015) 'Tripartite Theory of Responsibility', I will in this essay analyse whether philosophical zombies are eligible for moral responsibility, and if so what type of moral responsibility they would be eligible for, i.e., whether it would be attributability, answerability or accountability. Furthermore, this essay will discuss if philosophical zombies and psychopaths are similar, and whether they are meant to be qualified for the same moral responsibility types, and if so, which type that would be. Additionally, this essay will discuss the dilemma that might arise if philosophical zombies are not suitable of being moral agents and bring up the debate of the moral agency of AI's. Thereby coming to the point if philosophical zombies are not fit to be held morally responsible.

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