Principles and the Purpose of Action : An inquiry into the relationship between the ethical and the political in the work of Hannah Arendt.

Sammanfattning: Hannah Arendt has been widely criticized for conceiving a theory of action and the public realm as devoid of any ethical restraints. This paper suggests that such criticism, as well as proponents of Arendt’s theory, fails to deal with her theory on its own terms and argue that her own notion of manifesting principles as the purpose of action, provides an account of political action that is ethically oriented towards our common world. Although such an account does not determine the rectitude of political judgement nor direct action towards ethically preconceived goals, it distinguishes political from practical reasoning as a distinct sphere of normativity that accords with the necessary conditions of Arendt’s theory of action. This paper suggests that the necessary conditions for a valid notion of action and thus a valid political normativity are (1): the performativity of action, (2): the autonomy of action and (3): action as the generative source of our common world. This paper concludes by suggesting that a proper critique or defence of Arendt’s theory of action should proceed by first engaging with the relationship between her notion of principles and the necessary conditions of a political normativity. Such an endeavor would refrain from shackling action according to the precepts of moral philosophy that either deny or downplay the importance of these conditions.