Kollektivt ansvar – Kollektiva perspektiv på straffrättens ansvarslära

Sammanfattning: Prohibited actions in which several individuals are contributing, are not uncommon and there are clear legal rules in how the courts are supposed to treat these particular questions. What I am illustrating in this thesis is, however, actions that can not be seen as actions performed by an individual, but rather by a group. The thesis has, therefore, a more philosophical approach on questions such as whether a group can perform a joint action. The purpose of this thesis is to get an understanding of how collective actions relates to Swedish criminal law. To meet this purpose I have studied criminal liability in Swedish law, since the foundation of criminal liability is of an individual nature. I have, in addition to criminal liability, been studying responsibility in the context of moral philosophy, where my focus has been directed to collective responsibility. To clarify the questions I want to answer I have chosen to look upon two different categories of crimes, which I believe illuminates the problems that are my subject. These types of crimes are crimes of terrorism and honour related crimes. My conclusions mostly refer to the legislators view on collective actions. I am of the opinion that the view of the legislator varies, depending on the effects on the world caused by the criminality. Terrorist crimes in general tends to lead to great effects on the surrounding world, where as honour related crimes tends to lead to small effects. The legislators view on these collective actions gets clarified in the special legislation of terrorist crimes, and in the absence of special legislation of honour related crimes.