Design for Recycling of e-products - The incentives under the Swedish Extended Producer Responsibility
Sammanfattning: The aim of this paper is to explore the incentives under the Swedish Extended Producer Responsibility that currently affect the design of electric and electronic products. Through tracing the incentives faced by different actors connected to e-waste we conclude that the incentives for promoting design for recycling are weak for each and every one of them. Foremost, we argue that this is the result of the diffusion of return on investments that appears in the collectively arranged system. Our analysis show that the product design choices upstream give rise to technological externalities in the recycling stage downstream. In turn, these create loss in social welfare both due to resource efficiency loss and entailed environmental externalities. We further discuss possible solutions to minimize this loss but acknowledge the difficulty in determining what would bring a more socially efficient outcome.
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