Endurantism and Atemporal Parthood

Sammanfattning: In this paper I will look at two common theories about persistence and their views on parthood. The two theories are Endurantism and Perdurantism, but I will also mention exdurantism which is a theory closely related to perdurantism. Endurantism is a three-dimensional theory which states that persisting objects are at every moment “wholly present” and have no temporal extent. Perdurantism and exdurantism on the other hand are four-dimensional theories which states that objects have temporal as well as spatial extent. The four-dimensional theories apply an atemporal parthood relation between a persisting object and its temporal parts, this means that a persisting object has its parts simpliciter. Three dimensionalists usually do not talk about a thing having temporal parts, but some philosophers think that there is nothing that restricts a three-dimensionalist from applying a similar understanding of parthood as the four-dimensionalist does. I will begin by taking a look at the different theories and their solutions to two common problems associated with persistence. Later on, I will look at the atemporal parthood relation that perdurantists apply to their theory and see if it really is something an endurantist could accept as well. I will make my conclusion based on what would logically follow from accepting the concept of atemporal parthood. I will argue that, while endurantists could accept path inclusion, they can in fact not apply an atemporal parthood relation between a persisting object and its temporal parts without their view collapsing into four-dimensionalism. I will also show that path inclusion cannot do the same job in solving these two problems that will be discussed. Besides this, my point will also be to argue that it is unmotivated (or even a mistake) for a three-dimensionalist to apply any three-dimensional version of atemporal parthood to their theory.