Förmånsbeskattning av delägare i fåmansföretag - En konsekvensanalys av slopade stoppregler

Sammanfattning: This essay is aiming to explain and analyse the consequences that occurred to the owners of closely held companies due to the abolishment of the special tax legislation in 2000. The right to decide is gathered within a few owners in closely held companies. In order to prevent that this enables advantages in taxation a special regulation was introduced for closely held companies in 1976. The special rules were abolished in 2000. Since 2000, benefits are taxed by reference to general rules of taxation of benefits. Benefit of the company’s property is generally taxable. An important question is whether a taxable benefit should be preceded by actual use or if the right of disposal itself can lead to benefit taxation. Legal text, statement in propositions and older case law express a requirement of actual use. However, after the abolishment of the special rules the courts have become more strictly towards the owners of closely held companies. The Supreme Administrative Court has determined that the right of disposal itself can lead to benefit taxation regardless of actual use. The special rules were more precise than the general rules of benefit taxation. The general rules provide a greater possibility for interpretation which has led to a stricter case law. This essay investigates whether this has been foreseen for owners of closely held companies or not. It results in a conclusion that taxation of the right of disposal itself cannot be seen in the legislation which implies poor predictability. The consequences of a poor predictability are analysed and conclude in conclusion that an owner of a closely held company risks financial concerns as a result of not being able to predict the taxation that can follow a transaction. In the long term, this can also lead to a reduced confidence in the tax system.