Bör aktieägare förespråka aktierelaterade incitamentsprogram? : - En kvantitativ studie av bolag noterade på Stockholmsbörsen

Detta är en Kandidat-uppsats från Uppsala universitet/Företagsekonomiska institutionen

Sammanfattning: Share-based incentive programs have become increasingly common in Sweden. At the same time, there is criticism of whether these have a positive effect on companies or not. The programs are intended to solve the so-called principal-agent problem, which arises when the ownership and control in a company are separated. Share-based incentive programs are intended to solve this dilemma by making the employees who participate in the program’s shareholders of the company. This study has examined whether share-based incentive programs benefit the companies’ shareholders. The study investigates this by using a first-difference method, based on the publicly traded companies at Nasdaq Stockholm. The study takes support from the principal-agent theory, the managerial power theory, and other studies within the field. The result from the study shows that there is no significant difference between the companies that use the share-based incentive programs and the companies that do not. Based on this result, it is concluded that share-related incentive programs do not benefit shareholders.

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