Tilltro och kritik inom rätten : en läsning av Jacques Derridas Lagens kraft

Detta är en Magister-uppsats från Södertörns högskola/Filosofi

Sammanfattning: The aim of this essay is to show how the relationship between credit and critique is important for Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of law. I will start from Force of Law, in which law, as well as justice, is deconstructed by Derrida. My purpose is further to show how the two concepts, credit and critique, are intertwined in the discourse of law and thereby crucial for Derrida’s deconstruction. As Derrida always states, the rational projects need to have a master concept, which the project revolves around, and this master concept needs at least one other subordinate concept to contrast itself against. In this context, I argue that critique can be that master concept. I base this argument upon the fact that critique in its ancient Greek sense, krinein, can be translated into the verb ‘to separate’, ‘to decide’ or ‘to judge’, which shows that there is an obvious link to the task of a judge. This puts critique in center of the discourse of law. Credit on the other hand is not rational, which makes it opposed to critique, but it is still important for law. It is a typical subordinated concept that just appears in the discourse without any further explanation but is present by its implicit importance to the discourse. I argue that credit is the subordinate concept that is needed for the concept of critique to be a master concept. Both concepts are important for the foundation of law, and this is why I believe that Derrida in the end states the importance to take responsibility for the law. In other words, one must take responsibility for both founding aspects of credit and critique when deconstructing the law.

  HÄR KAN DU HÄMTA UPPSATSEN I FULLTEXT. (följ länken till nästa sida)