Analys av internationella förhandlingar som resultat av ett tre-nivå spel : Bosnien & Hercegovina i förhandlingar med EU

Sammanfattning: The purpose of this inquiry is to examine weather Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory could be expanded to a third level. Furthermore, the study seeks to answer the question weather international negotiations can be played on three levels. For the purpose of the study, the two-level game theory will be applied to the ongoing negotiations between Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH) and the European Union. The third level will be investigated by considering United States’ role and its frequent involvement in negotiations. The General Framework Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) that ended the four-year war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with additional political and economic involvement of the USA in BiH will be utilized to signify the existence of the third level. The argument of this paper has been developed using qualitative research methods, where interviews have been combined with an analysis of contents. The study’s findings have several implications for the existence of the third-level. First, results demonstrate that Bosnian political figures fail to recognize USA’s involvement in the negotiation process. Second, study indicates an indirect, but intense influence of the United States due to its strategic interests. Third, the study significantly contributes to the international negotiations by incorporating the events on all three levels that influence all negotiation outcomes. The use of qualitative methods in this study deepened theoretical understanding of the three-level game, provided useful application for practitioners and opened up an opportunity to provide even greater understanding of international negotiations as a whole.