EU burden-sharing in the Refugee Crisis: A Strategic Game Perspective

Sammanfattning: Recent developments in migration filed within EU showed problematic character of EU member states co-operation in face of migration burden-sharing. Migration crisis of 2015-2016 shed a light on migration burden-sharing and made subject one of the most discussed issues in European Union. There is a continues flow of migrants who want to enter and lodge their application for protection in EU states. Therefore EU boarder states are often faced with overwhelming number of migrants, number that exceeds their receiving capacity. Consequently there is need for migration burden-sharing. But, since reception of asylum seekers is connected to costs and is overall politically sensitive subject we see limited migration burden-sharing practiced by EU member states. This project analyses member states behaviour from game theoretical viewpoint applying non-cooperational game model Prisoner’s Dilemma to problematic burden-sharing practices within EU. Aim of the paper is to find out if game theory is a sufficient basis for explaining and understanding member state behavior in regards of migration burden-sharing, on the background of migration crisis 2015-2016. It even examines hypothesis regarding weather EU provides member states with sufficient settings for practicing migration burden-sharing.