Agentrelationer och styrning i familjeföretag

Detta är en D-uppsats från Handelshögskolan i Stockholm/Institutionen för redovisning och finansiering

Sammanfattning: The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the competitiveness of family firms is affected by governance mechanisms. The thesis addresses four governance mechanisms: inefficient labor markets, inefficient capital markets, self control and altruism. We have conducted an abductive method to be able to perform a qualitative research study. In this study two family firms have been examined, ROL and Indiska Magasinet. We conclude that the presence of inefficient labor and capital markets within the studied family firms give rise to negative effects in terms of difficulties of hiring talented employees. Self control is foremost found in one of the firms where the decision process is dominated by the owner-manager. Our study shows partial support for the presence of altruism, a governance mechanism that is unique for family firms, which increases the communication and cooperation between family members. Perhaps the most profound conclusion from our study is the need to address governance mechanisms in order to increase the competitiveness of family firms.

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