Greedy Politicians? An Empirical Test of the Public Choice Theory

Detta är en C-uppsats från Handelshögskolan i Stockholm/Institutionen för nationalekonomi

Sammanfattning: This study aims to empirically test the postulate of Public Choice of politicians as self-interested. To achieve this we examine whether local politicians in Sweden take the opportunity to exploit the compensation systems for municipal assembly meetings. We use two different approaches to examine if this behavior exists. The first is to look at municipalities with a cut-off point system that allows for clear strategies to maximize economic return. The other is to compare whether politicians in municipalities with a fixed compensation arrange their meeting time differently than those with an hourly pay in order to increase their compensation. We find no evidence of such behavior in neither of the cases, however we cannot rule out the possibility that the politicians still have other self-interested motives.

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