SSNIP-testet och dess applicerbarhet - En undersökning av när SSNIP-testet är ett adekvat verktyg vid konkurrensrättslig marknadsdefiniering

Sammanfattning: Economic evidence tools, such as the SSNIP-test, can pose practical problems in competition law since economists have little understanding of the law and lawyers have little understanding of economics. Competition law is characterized by economic evidence because of the economic nature of the subject. Therefore, it is of value to describe and analyse the conditions and limits for when the SSNIP-test is an adequate tool. The present thesis aims to do just that, especially in the light of the case law provided by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The thesis provides enlightenment of the relevance and functioning of the SSNIP-test and a review of case law when the test was presented as evidence. The case law describes the conditions under which the SSNIP-test is (and is not) an adequate tool in defining the relevant market. Situations, when the SSNIP-test can be an inadequate tool, are for example the Cellophane Fallacy, double-sided/multi-sided markets and when the demand side is very price elastic. An example of when the test is adequate in the situation of an exceedingly price elastic demand side is in the pharmaceutical sector. The test can also, if required by the context, be an adequate tool for short-term application, although this does not fully follow the basic functioning of the test. The SSNIP-test can be modified to be an adequate tool under more conditions than what follows from the basic functioning of the test.