Misslyckande trots numerär överlägsenhet : en teorikonsumerande studie om luftoperativ kontroll under Falklandskriget

Sammanfattning: This study examines how Argentina’s failure to obtain control of the air during the Falklands war can be explained based on the theories of John A. Warden and Philip S. Meilinger. The failure is problematic due to the numerical superiority and geographical advantage of the Argentinian Air Force. Previous studies have focused on the absence of airborne early warning, air-to-sea warfare and the perspective of Clausewitz theories. The purpose of this study is therefore the to develop a theory-based explanation of the Argentinian failure from the perspective of two air-warfare theories. The first day of the war (May 1) and the landing on the shores of San Carlos constitute crucial parts of the air war. The paper utilizes a theory consuming approach to explain the two cases and then comparing them to develop an aggregated explanation of the Argentinian failure. The result of the analysis is that Argentinian failure to identify and attack Britain’s aircraft carriers/landing ships, failure to concentrate the offensive operations and selective British air defence are key parts of the explanation. The results contributes to a deeper understanding of a perspective of the Falklands air war that has not been analysed in previously analysed in earlier academic studies.