Gemensam krishantering – En mikrovärldsstudie om effekten av olika incitament

Sammanfattning: This paper aims to increase the knowledge on how decision making is impacted by different incentives and different levels of collaboration. Experiments were carried out in a micro world called MikroRisk in groups of three students each, where half of the groups had simple incentives and the other half had double incentives. Simple incentives meant that the group members only had to concentrate on minimizing the total consequence, whereas double incentives meant that the group focused on minimizing total consequences as well as each group member focused on minimizing his/her own consequences. No statistical difference between simple and double incentives regarding consequence or shared resources could be found, the students did not either seem to act differently due to the incentives. Comparison between the students and experienced fire and rescue service commanders was also conducted and it was found that there was a statistical difference between shared resources, where the students share more resources. No statistical difference in total consequences was found between the experienced fire and rescue service commanders and the students. During the experiments it was discovered that groups that estimated their cooperation to be good succeeded to achieve less total consequences than groups that estimated their cooperation to be poor. This result is good for Swedish crisis management, since it is to a large part built up by daily collaboration in order to achieve effective cooperation when the crisis hits.