Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning : En studie om tillämpningen av den svenska koden för bolagsstyrning i förhållande till ägarstrukturen

Sammanfattning: Corporate governance has become an increasingly more debated subject the last couple of decades. It all started with the managements of some companies going in their own direction, a direction which was not always in the best interest of the shareholders and that made the shareholders react a certain way. More and more countries developed codes/guidelines for how a company should be run and how to strengthen the relationship between management and shareholders. The thing these countries have in common is that their codes are based on a ”comply or explain”-principle where a company has the opportunity to either follow the code to the fullest or explain why they chose do deviate from the code or guidelines set. The purpose of this research was to find a connection between ownership structure and the way the company followed the code in Sweden. The researchers in charge had the sole purpose of finding out whether there is a difference in companies which have concentrated ownership structures and those with a dispersed structure regarding their ways of following the code. The research is based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative onset where the quantitative method was used to compile the data from the annual reports and corporate governance reports in the shape of deviations. The qualitative onset was used to process and analyze the reasons and explanations for why a company chose to deviate from the code. The conclusion of the research was that there is a connection between ownership structure in companies and their code compliance. The companies with a concentrated ownership structure deviated from the code on guidelines which specifically pertain to whom gets to be a part of the decision making units. A logical explanation for this is that companies with a concentrated ownership structure are more likely to engage their controlling shareholders to a greater extent than the code recommends. On the other hand, companies with a dispersed ownership structure had a harder time engaging their shareholders, though with understandable reasons and therefore do not deviate from the code on these grounds.