KÖN SOM STRAFFSKÄRPNINGSGRUND – Bör kön som motiv till en brottslig gärning föranleda ett hårdare straff?

Sammanfattning: The increased digitalisation has resulted in a large portion of the population being connected in a digital environment and engaging with each other on digital platforms. A certain type of problem that has been addressed involves women being targeted by online abuse, because they are seen as group members that represent their gender and characteristics related to gender. Women compared to men are more likely to be subjected to sexualised threats of violence. A committee of inquiry has recently been appointed to investigate whether offences with the motive for the act being to insult somebody on grounds of his or her gender should lead to an increased penalty value by the rule in Ch. 29, sec. 2, p. 7 of the Swedish Criminal Code (Sw. brottsbalken [1962:700]). Simultaneously the Committee will investigate if there is an actual need to include gender as a protected ground in the mentioned provision, since there is a possibility to increase the penalty value under the legislation in force due to such motive.  This essay strives to investigate how gender as a motive of crime is considered when applying the law, wherefore the current legislation will be addressed. The Committee seems to have its starting point in the rule on aggravating circumstances related to hate crime, which in its nature constitutes a part of the general hate crime legislation. Therefore, gender as a protected ground in the hate crime legislation is examined. A comparative law analysis is made to Finnish law which will include gender as a ground in a similar rule. A proposal for a directive from the European Union regarding gender-based acts is referred to, because of its impact on Swedish legislation once adopted by the European Parliament. Relevant legal literature is also of interest when answering if gender-based acts should be considered as hate crime. The protection for transgender people under hate crime legislation is briefly addressed to gain valuable insights to compare this group’s protection with cisgender persons’ current or future protection. A case study is performed with two judgments from the Courts of Appeal to discover similarities and differences between these judgements regarding the evaluation of the defendant’s motive to the crime. To not limit the sources of material a combined legal dogmatic and analytical method is applied. This method allows for the use of criminological literature and governmental manuals to answer the questions at issue. Throughout the analysis it is made clear that gender as a motive to an act, is not implemented by the courts. Furthermore, the advantages and disadvantages of a tougher legal approach, regarding gender-based acts and gender as a protected ground in the rule on aggravating circumstances related to hate crime, are discussed.  In conclusion women are far more exposed to gender-based acts in a digital environment and there are good reasons to let such motive increase the penalty value. Women as a group should be included in the rule on aggravating circumstances due to their exposure to gender-based acts. Simultaneously it is important that the Committee considers acts outside of the digital sphere, due to the general applicability of the rule. The Committee is encouraged to determine whether gender ought to be a protected ground in all hate crime legislation.