RÄTTVISA BORTOM GRÄNSERSJÄLVRESPEKT SOM KOSMOPOLITISK PLIKT : Om global distributiv rättvisa: ett normativt rättfärdigande

Sammanfattning: This essay focus on the normative debate between cosmopolitanism and statism in the context of global distributive justice. The notion of basic structure and negative rights examines separately in two questions to understand distributive justice as a global subject rather than only national. Statists as Rawls holds the position that global distributive justice prerequisite a basic structure with coercive instrument. Pogge as cosmopolitan arguments for the existence of global basic structure, by addressing inequalities in real-world politics, in the form of negative rights violation. The aim of this study is to justify global distributive justice on cosmopolitan duties, based on normative political theory, reflective equilibrium, and conceptual analysis. The main issue is formulated into two questions in the following: • Does reciprocity constitute a global basic structure that presupposes resource distribution? • Can self-respect as foundation of rights justify global distributive justice? I do this first by analyzing the concept of basic structure, based on the notion reciprocity. This is to identify the basic structure of the global system that prerequisite global distributive justice. Second, I analyze Pogge’s formulation of negative rights as cosmopolitan rights, to modify them to a positive concept of rights. This is in purpose to avoid the libertarian counterargument presented by Narveson, that negative rights fail as a ground of cosmopolitan duties. I show first that coercion is not a necessary condition, but only sufficient for the basic structure. Thus, the global basic structure exists and prerequisite distributive justice, based on reciprocity. Unlike the national basic structure of coercive instrument, the global basic structure grounds on several global threats and challenges that tie all nations as alternative concept of coercion. Second, I show that cosmopolitan duties can be grounded on positive rights. I do this through the notion of self-respect and deontological ethics, which success to avoid the libertarian critique of cosmopolitan duties.