The Dynamics of Preserving Transitive Choice and Preference: Transitivity in the context of Choice Blindness

Sammanfattning: In most normative and prescriptive decision theories, transitivity is a presumed property of any preference relation, stating that for any choice alternatives x, y, z and preference relation R, if xRy and yRz, then xRz. However, what is normatively expected of an ideally rational agent may still be descriptively false under certain contexts and empirically motivated decision models. One such possible context is that of Choice Blindness manipulation. Current investigations attempts a purposeful elicitation of intransitivity by utilizing preference change effects following choice blindness manipulation. To the extent that this is possible, the thesis seeks to discern possible cognitive mechanisms that contribute to the defence or preservation of transitivity in choice and preference. Initial results indicate no effect of choice blindness manipulation on the rates of intransitive preference. Further analysis demonstrates different patterns of behavior which are most readilty interpreted as attempts at defending against intransitive or otherwise preserving already transitive choice structures.