En fallstudie för att förklara agerandet under U 137-krisens tio dagar

Sammanfattning: This thesis is based on the grounding of the Soviet submarine U 137 that ran aground just outside the naval base of Karlskrona in October 1981. The Swedish authorities held the submarine for ten days before it was released back to the waiting Soviet naval force. During this time the Swedish government and military leaders had to take decisions regarding this crisis and what to do. After the discovery of some kind of radioactivity onboard U 137 the crisis escalated because no one expected to find nuclear weapons in the Baltic Sea. In this thesis there are certain decisions that are analyzed in order to explain why the government acted like they did. The theories to help explain the decisions are from Allison & Zelikow´s book ”Essence of Decision – Explaining the Missile Crisis” from 1999. All three of the theories are brought to use on different part of the decisions. The decisions that are analyzed in this thesis are chosen because of their importance for the outcome of the crisis.