VEMS IDÉ VAR DET EGENTLIGEN? En statistisk analys av kommunala tjänstemäns inflytande i beslutsfattandet

Sammanfattning: This study explores the relationship between politicians and civil servants in public administration, focusing on the alleged information advantage of civil servants and its impact on decision-making. Historically, there have been concerns about the potential for civil servants to exploit their knowledge advantage over politicians. The debate has shifted from a focus on political control and civil servants' freedom of action to a more nuanced view in which politics and policy are created in an interdependent way. This view is similar to the administrative model advocated by Carl J. Friedrich in his debate with Herman Finer in the 1940s, in which civil servants were given considerable freedom and a central role in decision-making. The purpose of the study is to clarify the role of civil servants in decision-making, especially when the information advantage is most evident. Through a statistical analysis of Swedish municipalities, the research examines the relationship between politicians' experience and civil servants' influence. The results suggest that civil servants adapt their proposals to politicians' perceptions rather than actively influencing decisions. This observation supports Friedrich's idea of civil servants' professionalism and restraint, which has implications for understanding administrative relations and accountability in the public sector.