Språk, verklighet & medverkansläran – En granskning av gärningsmannaskapets innebörd

Sammanfattning: When several individuals have been involved in a criminal act, the court allocates roles between perpetrators, instigators, and accomplices. Regarding the first role of responsibility, an individual may himself or jointly with others have carried out the criminal act, alternatively be considered the perpetrator. Thus, Swedish criminal law encompasses a multifaceted concept of a perpetrator. An initial dogmatic consideration is whether the designation only should refer to the person who performed the act in the sense of the penalty provision. Therefore, the purpose of this essay is to examine the doctrine of perpetrator, particularly the reasons for and consequences of its interpretation. The study is conducted based on the notion that philosophical science can deepen or at least inspire the discussion of criminal law theory. Regarding the criminal law's view of individual conduct, it is noted that it does not correspond with the general public’s perception of what it is, nor with academic philosophical theories. Research in general philosophy has investigated what it means to do something on one's own. It is presented therein that an action, which forms the basis of the criminal act, must consist of a bodily movement. Specifically, based on the concept of action, as well as causality, other forms of responsibility, and the classification's relation to the gravity of the offense, the essay clarifies that several forms of perpetrator lack a scientific foundation. This includes indirect, extended, and converted perpetration. A joint performance is considered something beyond what was achieved individually. In its most extreme form, the dogmatic construction co-perpetration can therefore be applied to a complicity which does not fulfill any of the requirements for the crime in question. That individual is judged as a co- perpetrator based on what he did jointly with others. Philosophers also believe that joint action is a special form of agency. However, there is no consensus on what the action entails. One theory describes the action as something transpersonal and collective. The essay clarifies, considering the research, that there are no grounds for a description and assessment on the collective level within criminal law. Instead, the co-perpetration appears to be highly problematic. Several criteria which are taken into account are unrealistic and fluid. Moreover, the examination reveals implications in assessing culpability, which undermine individual criminal responsibility, the assessment of the severity of the punishment and the requirement of proportionality. The view of joint action also poses special considerations for practitioners when formulating statement of the criminal act as charged and reasoning, which becomes problematic for individuals accused or convicted of a crime. For a language- and reality-adapted administration of justice, it is necessary that the intention to describe a specific occurrence as something joint does not preclude individuals from being assessed and categorized individually. Therefore, it is incorrect to equate joint execution with perpetration. Such an application, as well as the general concept of perpetration, solely seem to be measures influenced by criminal politics aligning to the current increasingly harsher political climate.