Affordansontologi och endurantism

Sammanfattning: This thesis intends to explore whether endurantism is compatible with realism. This is done by presenting an alternative approach, where instead of starting with Quine’s postulate, that being and existence are the same thing, those are treated as different things. By using minimal realism, where you only say that something exists independently of a creature, and an ontological theory based on affordances, a thesis that endurantism is compatible with realism is presented. Affordance ontology means that what something is depends on what actions it can offer a certain human. Objections that this might lead to relativism are answered, as actions are independent of a specific creature. Objections that minimal realism isn’t realism are answered on the grounds of it being independent of a human, and thus is realism. Finally, the thesis is concluded to be true, but more work is needed to explain temporal facts.