Belägringen av Bakhmut: ett önskat utfall eller ett symptom av misslyckande?

Sammanfattning: The sieges in Ukraine demonstrate a resurgence of the siege phenomenon in modern conventional warfare. However, the siege of Bakhmut seems to be very costly for little use, which raises the question how we can understand it. The purpose of the study is to investigate how the siege of Bakhmut can be understood from using the terms attrition and maneuver warfare. To define the concepts, Edward Luttwak and Hans Delbrück theories were chosen and the methodology used in the study was a qualitative text analysis of media and think tanks reporting on the siege of Bakhmut. The conclusion of the analysis was that the intensity of the siege increased as the purpose of the siege became more politicized, but also two different perspectives on the siege emerged. One view suggests that the siege was a result of failed maneuver and confusion in the purpose of the operation. The other view suggests that the siege was an active choice based on the Wagner group's political background and the low quality of infantry. Of these two, the latter was considered the most relevant. The implications of the conclusions are that Bakhmut breaks an identified pattern in Russian siege art by Kristin Ljungqvist, where the siege of Bakhmut is not considered a failure of maneuver but rather a desired outcome. Finally, it is recommended to repeat the study when a source material of a higher critical value exists.