NATO och den (Gemensamma) Säkerhets- och Försvarspolitiken i Libyen - En teoriutvecklande studie av valet mellan två militärallianser

Sammanfattning: The Libyan revolution in the spring of 2011 highlighted the choice between NATO and CSDP as the responsible organization for the subsequent military intervention in the country. The aim of this thesis is to study the factors contributing to the choice of NATO over CSDP for the intervention in Libya and to provide existing alliance theory with explanatory factors to the choice between two already existing military alliances for major military operations. The study applies basic theories of alliance formation, alliance management and alliance leadership to the unique case of the Libya intervention and the choice between NATO and CSDP in an effort to test the theory against the specified case and to develop it to be applicable to similar choices between military alliances. The thesis shows that NATO was choosen over CSDP because the transatlantic alliance had the relevant military capacities, the institutional structure necessary and the support of the alliances leading states while CSDP had insufficient military and institutional capacities and was split by internal differences. The conclusion is thus that the choice between two military alliances for a military operation depends on the alliances aggregated military capacities, the effectiveness of alliance institutions and the will and ambition of leading states.